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ABSTRACT
A long-standing puzzle in the fiscal federalism literature is the empirical non-equivalence in
government spending from grants and other income. I propose a fully rational model in which
violations of fungibility arise from dynamic interactions between politicians and interest groups with
the ability to raise funds for local government. The predictions of the model are tested by exploiting
unique features of windfalls received by states under a settlement with the tobacco industry.
Although  windfalls  are  unrestricted,  the  median  state  increased  spending  on  tobacco  control
programs from zero to $2.30 per capita upon receipt of funds. The marginal propensity to spend on
such programs is 0.20 from settlement revenue and zero from overall income. States which were not
involved in the settlement lawsuits spend less. The findings are consistent with the predictions of
the model when political partisanship is introduced: Republican governors spend less and factors
which should lead to political convergence increase spending for Republicans and decrease spending
for Democrats. These results cannot be explained by existing models in the literature.
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Standard models of ￿scal federalism predict that grants received by local governments should be
considered equivalent to increases in the income of the local constituency. Perhaps the most
commonly studied violation of this fungibility principle is the ￿ ypaper anomaly: the empirical ob-
servation that money "sticks where it hits." Local governments spend more from intergovernmental
grants than from equivalent increases in constituent income, and grants for particular programs
tend to increase spending on those programs far more than standard theory suggests. Numerous
studies have documented the existence of ￿ ypaper e⁄ects, with estimates of the increase in local
spending arising from a dollar grant ranging from 25 cents to one dollar (Hines and Thaler 1995).1
I propose a new, rational model of government spending decisions that focuses on the potential
role of special interest groups in in￿ uencing the allocation of public funds. In this model, special
interest groups have the ability to raise funds for local governments by undertaking costly e⁄ort.
In a dynamic setting, it is optimal for rational politicians to take the preferences of these interest
groups into account when making spending decisions to ensure that groups have incentives to
undertake the e⁄ort costs of raising funds in the future. I test the predictions of the model by
examining the response of state spending on tobacco prevention and control programs to receipt of
windfalls arising from state lawsuits against the tobacco industry.
There are few theories in the existing literature that can explain observed violations of fungibil-
ity. Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal (1982) propose a model in which agenda-setting bureaucrats
are able to hide grants from voters. While this model predicts that money received by govern-
ments will remain at the government level, it does little to explain why categorical grants should
systematically increase expenditure in particular spending categories. Models focusing on rent
1Models illustrating the standard revenue equivalence proposition include Bradford and Oates (1971a, 1971b).
See Gramlich (1977), Inman (1979) Fisher (1982) and Hamilton (1983) for a review of the earlier ￿ ypaper literature.
More recent work includes Baicker (2001), Gordon (2004), Lutz (2004), and Evans and Owens (2005).
1seeking by public o¢ cials (Inman 1979), ￿scal illusion (Oates 1979), voter uncertainty (Turnbull
1992), possible di⁄erences in the tax burden of the average versus median voter (Fisher 1982) or the
deadweight costs associated with raising tax revenue (Hamilton 1986) similarly predict that grants
should produce a greater increase in government spending than equal increases in constituent in-
come but make no predictions about the allocation of spending across categories. Hines and Thaler
(1995) argue that these e⁄ects can be explained by voter mental accounting; however, I present
evidence that is di¢ cult to reconcile with a simple mental accounting story.
Two studies explicitly consider the processes by which grants received by local governments are
determined and the potential role of such processes in generating violations of fungibility across
spending categories. Chernick (1979) argues that granting agencies allocate project grants to
communities willing to commit more local funds to the project, creating implicit matching require-
ments even for lump sum grants. Knight (2002) proposes a legislative bargaining model in which
a bargaining process at the federal level leads to endogenous grants that re￿ ect local spending
preferences. Applying this model to federal highway grants, he ￿nds that instrumenting for grants
with measures of political bargaining power eliminates apparent ￿ ypaper e⁄ects.
I focus instead on the interaction between special interest groups and government. A substan-
tial literature exists addressing the role of special interest groups in in￿ uencing political decision-
making. However, to the best of my knowledge, existing work has not considered the potential
in￿ uence of special interest groups on local spending in the ￿scal federalism context.2
I exploit unusual features of windfalls that states received as a result of a 1998 settlement with
the tobacco industry to test the special interest group model against alternative hypotheses. The
tobacco settlement agreement resolved multiple lawsuits ￿led by states against the tobacco industry
2Dougan and Kenyon (1988) examine a potential role for pressure groups in generating ￿ ypaper e⁄ects. In their
model, however, interest groups are not responsible for procuring grants and they assume limited crowd-out by local
governments.
2during the 1990s. Under the terms of the settlement, tobacco companies must pay states large
annual sums (on the order of $7 billion per year) in perpetuity. I examine the response of state
spending on tobacco prevention and control programs to receipt of settlement funds.
Two key features of the settlement windfalls are advantageous for testing violations of fungibility
in the allocation of funds. First, settlement money is unrestricted and use of funds is left entirely to
the discretion of states. Settlement windfalls should therefore, in theory, be considered equivalent
to increases in state income. Second, I demonstrate that the timing and magnitude of windfalls
are plausibly exogenous to desired spending on tobacco control programs. Grants do not re￿ ect
underlying spending preferences and are truly lump-sum, without explicit or implicit matching
provisions. The models proposed by Chernick and Knight are therefore not applicable in this
case.3
I ￿nd clear evidence of violations of fungibility in government spending decisions. Average per
capita spending on tobacco control programs increased more than six-fold from the ￿scal year before
settlement revenues were received to the ￿scal year after receipt. The marginal propensity to spend
on such programs is 0.20 from settlement revenues and zero from other income. I ￿nd that states
that did not ￿le lawsuits prior to the settlement, where anti-tobacco interest groups presumably
exerted less e⁄ort, spend signi￿cantly less on tobacco control programs after the settlement. Finally,
I show that spending patterns conform closely to the predictions of the model in a world with
political partisanship. Republican governors spend less than Democrats, and factors which should
lead to political convergence, namely eligibility for re-election and facing an opposition controlled
senate, result in increased spending by Republicans and decreased spending by Democrats.
This empirical setting di⁄ers in at least two important ways from traditional empirical ￿ ypaper
3Concerns that apparent violations of fungibility may be driven by econometric misspeci￿cations, such as incorrect
treatment of price e⁄ects arising from matching grants (Mo¢ tt 1984) or omitted variable bias (Hamilton 1983) are
also unlikely to be problematic.
3studies. First, as mentioned, settlement revenues are unrestricted. Examining the response of
spending on tobacco prevention and control programs to settlement windfalls therefore provides a
test of fungibility but di⁄ers from classic ￿ ypaper since revenues were not speci￿cally labeled for
such programs. Second, transfers in this case are from private industry to local government, rather
than intergovernmental transfers. While these features have advantages in distinguishing among
alternative models, they also raise potential caveats in generalizing the ￿ndings to other settings.
I consider these issues in the concluding section of the paper.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
provides background on the settlement agreement and payments. Section 4 describes the empirical
methodology and data used, and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Interest Groups and the Allocation of Funds
"It￿ s moral treason to me. We got all this money, then legislatures and governors
who were not even in this ￿ght act like the money fell out of heaven and spend it on
the political whim of the day." ￿Mississippi Attorney General Michael Moore on state
decisions to spend settlement funds on non-tobacco related programs (New York Times,
2001)
2.1 Motivation
Grants-in-aid from the federal government to states are of two main types: mandatory "entitle-
ment" grants, for which spending is determined by existing law, and discretionary grants, for which
funding is allocated on an annual basis. In ￿scal year 2003, almost 60% of federal dollars given in
grants-in-aid to states, excluding Medicaid, were discretionary.4 In this system, interest groups
have the ability to in￿ uence grants-in-aid through contributions and lobbying e⁄orts. Interest
4Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. The primary mandatory grants-in-aid from the federal govern-
ment to states are through Medicaid, food stamp, and welfare programs. Most other grants-in-aid are discretionary.
4groups are large contributors to federal legislators: during the 1997-1998 election cycle, over 4,500
Political Action Committees spent almost $500 million dollars and a variety of other organizations
spent $1.5 billion on lobbying Washington.5 A substantial literature (Becker 1983, Grossman 1994,
Grossman and Helpman 2001) has shown that these groups do have the power to in￿ uence policy
and the distribution of grants.
In this paper, I develop a model of how interest groups procuring funds at the federal level can
in￿ uence the allocation of public funds at the local level. I de￿ne an interest group broadly as
any agent who has the ability to in￿ uence grants to local governments and has speci￿c spending
preferences that may di⁄er substantially from the local median voter.6 Why should local gov-
ernments not treat these grants as fungible once they are received? I argue that this occurs as
the result of a dynamic interaction between interest groups and local government. If an interest
group raises funds for its preferred good and the local government does not increase spending on
that good, interest groups have no incentive to undertake the costs of procuring grants. Local
governments must trade o⁄ the social welfare bene￿t of treating funds as fungible against the cost
of losing future grants.
My empirical analysis focuses on a particular case: the tobacco settlement. Similar interac-
tions between interest groups and government, however, are common in a wide variety of settings.
Discretionary grants-in-aid to states include allocations for local health programs, environmental
projects, schools, law enforcement and workforce programs, and are lobbied for by interest groups
ranging from medical associations to labor unions. The model is therefore applicable to violations
of fungibility in a number of contexts.7
5Source: The Center for Responsive Politics. www.opensecrets.org.
6An "interest group" could also be a group within the government, as long as these two conditions are met.
7 For example, the types of interactions I describe provide one possible explanation for the ￿ ypaper e⁄ects observed
by Evans and Owens (2005) in the COPS program.
52.2 Model
I begin with a simple stylized reputation model in which a long-run government player interacts
with a number of short-run interest group players.8
An interest group derives utility from spending on a particular good that it cares about: the
"lobby good," z. It cannot produce z directly but can raise amount L for the local government by
exerting e⁄ort. The government chooses spending on a variety of goods, including z, conditional on
funds received from the interest group and other income Y . I do not assume political agency by the
government in order to demonstrate that violations of fungibility are possible even in a framework
equivalent to one in which decisions are made by a median voter. I consider the implications of
the model in a world with political agency and partisanship in Section 5.5.4. I make the strong
assumption that lobby groups are homogeneous and that all lobby goods enter the government
utility function in the same way.9 For simplicity, I also restrict the interest group e⁄ort choice to
be binary.
The government makes its decision simultaneously with its interest group opponent in each
period. In the case in which the government receives no funds from the interest group, it solves
the following problem:
max
z;x UG(z;x) subject to pzz + pxx ￿ Y; (1)
where z represents the lobby good (also a "good" in the government utility function) and x repre-
sents other government and private voter goods. Prices in this case represent the cost of production
of the various goods. Solving this problem gives the optimal choice of goods, which I denote as:
(z0;x0). When an interest group chooses to raise funds for the government, it does so with an
8This model adapts standard models of reputation with a single long-run player; see Kreps and Wilson (1982),
Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Fudenberg and Tirole (1998).
9Allowing heterogeneity in lobby goods does not alter the basic intuition of the model.
6implicit understanding that the government will provide "payback" by spending the funds on the
good the interest group cares about, z. Whether payback occurs depends on two factors: the type
of the government and the action chosen by the government.
This model assumes two types of governments: Committed and Strategic. The Committed
government always chooses Reciprocate. The Strategic government can choose one of two strategies:
Reciprocate or Renege. I de￿ne these in the following way. Under Renege, the government breaks
the implicit contract and treats the interest group funds as it would other income, maximizing
UG(z;x) subject to the constraint pzz + pxx ￿ Y + L. Solving this problem leads to a choice of
goods along the government￿ s income expansion path: (z0;x0). Under Reciprocate, the government
spends all the interest group funds on the lobby good, leading to the consumption choices (b z; b x).
The government would prefer to allocate L across all goods and would therefore be better o⁄ by
reneging.
I assume that interest groups have utility functions such that UL(b z;e⁄ort) > UL(z0;no e⁄ort)
and UL(z0;e⁄ort) < UL(z0;no e⁄ort); that is, interest groups prefer to undertake e⁄ort and provide
L if and only if the government pays them back.





No E⁄ort (0;0) (0;0)
The Nash equilibrium of the stage game is then (No E⁄ort, Renege) yielding payo⁄s of (0;0)
even though (E⁄ort, Reciprocate) results in higher payo⁄s (a;c) for both players.
I now consider the implications of this model in a dynamic setting in which the government
10The zero payo⁄s in the second row arise from normalizing UG(z
0;x
0) and UL(z
0;no e⁄ort) to zero for simplicity.
The payo⁄s in the ￿rst row are then as follows: a = UL(b z;e⁄ort), b = jUL(z
0;e⁄ort)j, c = UG(b z; b x), and d = UG(z
0;x
0).
7interacts with an interest group in each period. An interest group observes the past actions of
the government with previous interest groups but not its type. In this setting, an interest group
will put forth e⁄ort if it has a su¢ ciently high belief that the government is Committed, and a
Strategic government has incentives to build a reputation for being Committed by paying back
interest groups.11 The goal of the government is to maximize its discounted sum of payo⁄s with a
discount factor ￿. I assume no borrowing or savings; the government must balance the budget in
each period.
Intuitively, Strategic governments face the following fundamental trade-o⁄: spending more on
the lobby good creates a social welfare loss relative to reneging and allocating interest group funds
across all goods; however, it generates a gain in the form of additional income from interest groups
in the future if the government is perceived to be Committed as a result.12
The model predicts violations of fungibility even in cases in which the government may be
unlikely to interact with a particular interest group repeatedly. By reneging on any interest group,
the government signals its type to all interest groups.
2.3 Solution and Comparative Statics
Suppose that the interest group￿ s prior probability that the government is Committed is p0. In the
one period case, the Strategic government always reneges, and the interest group provides e⁄ort if
p0a ￿ (1 ￿ p0)b > 0. This occurs when the prior probability that the government is Committed
11This setup corresponds to the standard reputation e⁄ects framework. Without multiple types, there is no
uncertainty for the interest group. As Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) point out, an alternative approach is to model
reputations in a repeated game of complete information with trigger strategies. For example, the interest group
could provide funds as long as the government has not reneged on a previous interest group and refuse to provide
funds as soon as the government reneges. This approach does not change the set of equilibria and does not capture
the idea that reputation corresponds to something the opponents have learned (Fudenberg and Tirole 1998).
12While altering the de￿nition of the Committed type changes some of the speci￿c empirical predictions of the
model, the basic intuition and result remain the same. The key condition is that the Committed type spends more
on the lobby good than the Strategic government would choose to spend in a static setting. As long as interest group
e⁄ort is conditional on a su¢ ciently high belief that the government is Committed, there exists scope for reputation
e⁄ects.
8exceeds a threshold value: p0 > b
a+b ￿ p.
In the two period case, the Strategic government can Renege in period 1, revealing its type.
The total payo⁄ to the government is then d + 0. The government can also Reciprocate in period
1 to build a reputation for commitment. If doing so causes the interest group to provide e⁄ort
in period 2, the government gets a total payo⁄ of c + ￿d. Solving yields the following necessary
condition for the Strategic government to Reciprocate:
c
d
> (1 ￿ ￿) (2)
The Strategic government is willing to Reciprocate in period 1 if doing so induces interest groups
to provide funds in period 2. If the condition in equation (2) holds, the equilibrium depends on
p0, the prior probability of a Committed government. If p0 > p, the government Reciprocates in
period 1 and interest groups provide e⁄ort in both periods. If p0 < p, the Strategic government
Reciprocates in period 1 with probability
p0a
(1￿p0)b. Interest groups are indi⁄erent about providing





= p2: Solving by induction to the N
period case, the prior probability of a Committed government (p0) required for the interest group





. For details of the solution, please
see Appendix A.1.
The standard revenue equivalence proposition states that government expenditure from grants
and from other income should be the same: @z
@L = @z
@Y . Much of the empirical literature on
categorical ￿ ypaper e⁄ects ￿nds instead that @z
@L > @z
@Y . This model implies a positive probability
of the government reciprocating, thereby spending more on z when it receives a grant than if it
followed the income expansion path, as long as the necessary condition given in equation (2) holds.
The model thus predicts systematic violations of fungibility across spending categories consistent
9with ￿ ypaper e⁄ects.
Violations of fungibility are more likely when ￿ is high (more weight is given to future periods),
holding the other parameters ￿xed. Equation (2) also shows that for a given ￿, the probability
that the government Reciprocates is increasing in c
d, the ratio of social welfare when the government













; where f￿> 0 (3)
We should be more likely to observe violations of fungibility when there are low costs of misallocating
toward the lobby good relative to pursuing the socially optimal spending path.
2.4 Alternative Models
One alternative theory is that governments spend lobby money on the lobby good because they
fear voter punishment if they behave otherwise. Such a model, however, would require either
behavioral preferences on the part of voters or a framework in which spending money on the lobby
good provides a costly signal of some other characteristic voters care about. Another alternative
is a bargaining model between interest groups and politicians. This type of model would need to
explain why interest groups are more willing or able to punish the local government when the funds
are for "their" good.
I now test some of the predictions of the special interest group model by examining state
responses to funds received under a settlement agreement with the tobacco industry.
103 Background on the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement
3.1 History
The Master Settlement Agreement represents the culmination of lawsuits ￿led by states against
the tobacco industry in the mid-1990s. More than 40 states brought suit against tobacco com-
panies, alleging that these companies violated consumer protection and antitrust laws, concealed
information about their products, manipulated nicotine levels in cigarettes in order to increase
their addictiveness, and conspired to keep less addictive products o⁄ the market. States sought
reimbursement from the tobacco industry for expenditures on tobacco-related illness.
A settlement proposal was negotiated by state attorneys general and the tobacco industry in
1997. The settlement was then proposed as Congressional legislation that would have been binding
for all states. However, the bill was voted down in June of 1998. During this period, Florida,
Minnesota, Mississippi and Texas negotiated independent settlement agreements with the tobacco
industry. After the failure of the bill, several states began negotiations with tobacco companies
to reach a joint settlement agreement that would not require Congressional approval. These
e⁄orts were successful, and in November of 1998, the remaining 46 states settled jointly under the
Multistate Master Settlement Agreement. The primary condition of the settlement agreement is
the requirement that the tobacco industry transfer large amounts of money to the states annually
in perpetuity.13
To be eligible to receive funds, each state was required to obtain approval of the settlement
from its state court, a process known as achieving state-speci￿c ￿nality. The ￿rst payments to the
states were disbursed when 80% of the states whose shares equaled 80% of total payments reached
state-speci￿c ￿nality. This occurred in November 1999, and the ￿rst payments were released the
13The settlement also placed strong restrictions on tobacco advertising practices. For the full text of the settlement
agreement see: http://naag.org/upload/1032468605_cigmsa.pdf.
11following month. Settlement revenue is unrestricted and the allocation mechanism and use of funds
are left entirely to the discretion of the states.
3.2 Payments
States receive three types of payments under the settlement: (1) initial payments, paid in ￿ve install-
ments from 1999 to 2003; (2) annual payments, paid in perpetuity; and (3) Strategic Contribution
Fund payments meant to compensate states for the costs incurred in state lawsuits, paid from
2008 to 2017. The two major adjustments made to annual settlement payments are an in￿ ation
adjustment and a volume adjustment. Annual payments increase by the CPI or 3%, whichever
is higher. The volume adjustment is based on increases or decreases in the number of cigarettes
shipped nationally relative to a base volume. The volume adjustment is not state-speci￿c. Initial
payments are subject to the volume adjustment but not the in￿ ation adjustment. At the time
of the settlement, total unadjusted payments made to settling states under the agreement through
2025 were projected to be almost $206 billion (Table 1), or $120 billion in present value terms using
a discount rate of 4%.
Table 2 provides a summary of settlement disbursements to states in ￿scal year 2002. The
average amount of revenue a state receives is $100 million annually, which corresponds to $22 per
capita and $100 per smoker.
Initial and annual payments are distributed among the states according to ￿xed state allocation
percentages. Base allocation percentages are calculated using a formula that equally weights two
factors: the state￿ s share of total direct medical costs related to smoking and the state￿ s share of
smoking-attributable Medicaid expenditures (Modisett 1997).
Total direct medical costs related to smoking represents smoking-related health costs incurred
by all payment sources in a state in 1990. Smoking-attributable Medicaid expenditures represents
12the amount of a state￿ s Medicaid expenditures directly attributable to smoking and to illnesses
associated with smokeless tobacco use for individuals over 18 in 1993.14 Two adjustments were
made to direct medical costs: ￿gures were multiplied by 1.28 to re￿ ect in￿ ation in medical costs
between 1990 and 1993 and Medicaid costs were then subtracted to prevent double counting of
these expenditures. The percent of the total settlement amount allocated to state i is then given
by the following formula:

















where SMCDi and AdjDMCi are the smoking-related Medicaid costs and the adjusted direct med-
ical costs for state i.
Negotiations among states at the time of the settlement resulted in some small adjustments
to these base percentages. Table 3 illustrates the allocation percentages as they would have
been had the above formula been followed as well as the actual percentages under the settlement.
Di⁄erences between the simulated and actual allocation percentages may not be completely random
(it is unlikely to be a coincidence that California and New York receive exactly the same shares) but
are generally very small. The coe¢ cient of correlation between the two is 0.99, and proxying for
actual settlement revenues using the simulated allocation percentages does not a⁄ect the results.
The size of a state￿ s windfall in a given year is then the aggregate annual payment, determined
under the terms of the settlement, multiplied by its allocation percentage. Allocation percentages
were ￿xed at the time of the settlement agreement, so states￿spending decisions do not a⁄ect future
14The population of each state was categorized into non-smokers, current smokers, former smokers with less than
15 years exposure and former smokers with greater than 15 years exposure. The e⁄ect of type of exposure on each
smoking-related medical condition and then the level of expenditure was estimated as a function of smoking, medical
conditions and health status. The costs do not re￿ ect lifetime medical care costs but rather medical care costs
paid for by all sources per year. Models controlled for age, race/ethnicity, poverty status, marital status, education,
medical insurance, region, seat-belt use and obesity. See Modisett (1997) for further details on calculations.
13revenues.15 Counties in New York and California receive a share of state settlement payments
directly since counties in these states bear a share of Medicaid costs. New York and California
state governments therefore receive 51% and 50% of their total state allocations, respectively.16
Smoking-attributable Medicaid and other health care costs in 1993 are the only systematic
determining factors of state settlement revenue receipt. These two factors alone account for
over 99% of the variation in settlement revenues if New York and California state revenues are
not adjusted for direct payments to counties and over 90% if revenues are adjusted (Table 4).17
Running the regression in per capita terms gives an R2 of 72% when New York and California
revenues are not adjusted and 53% when revenues are adjusted. Per capita settlement revenues
are orthogonal to a variety of other potentially relevant state characteristics (column 6). Controls
for state income per capita, an indicator for whether the state had a large pre-existing tobacco
control program, the share of the state population under 18 and the conservativeness of the state
as measured by Republican vote share in the 2000 presidential election are all insigni￿cant.
4 Empirical Methodology and Data
4.1 Testing the Main Prediction of the Interest Group Model
The interest group model predicts that when interest groups are instrumental in procuring funds,
governments will spend these funds disproportionately on the interest group￿ s preferred goods. In
the case of the tobacco settlement, lawsuits were orchestrated largely by state attorneys general
with substantial involvement by anti-tobacco and health organizations. A large body of anecdo-
15State spending on tobacco control programs could a⁄ect future revenues in an extremely indirect way through
the national volume adjustment. However, this e⁄ect would bias against spending on such programs.
16The direct payment of a share of settlement revenues to counties in these states raises an interesting set of
questions about the response of state governments to increased county revenues. I do not address these issues here.
17Coe¢ cients di⁄er from 0.5 because the regressions are run on the levels of smoking-related health costs rather
than the shares.
14tal evidence indicates that these groups felt that settlement dollars should be spent on tobacco
prevention and control programs. The following quote is typical:
"A compassionate but na￿ve person would expect the states to use their $246 billion [sic]
windfall to try to prevent more people from su⁄ering and dying from cancer, emphysema
or other smoking related illnesses. If this is blood money, why not try to stop the
bleeding? Ah, but the greedy deal makers in our state capitals have other plans for
the money ... I￿ m talking about construction projects. Paying bills, new non-medical
programs ... Most of this spending would be ￿ne if it came out of state tax revenue, but
... this money should not be poured into general funds. It should be used to help prevent
and cure disease." ￿Judy Jarvis, radio host and lung cancer victim (New York Times,
1999)
I therefore focus my analysis on state spending on tobacco prevention and control programs.
Figure 1 illustrates the number of states allocating substantial funds toward such programs over
time. Although the settlement agreement was reached in 1998, states ￿rst received funds in the
middle of the 2000 ￿scal year. The number of states spending at least $0.50 per capita on tobacco
control programs increased almost six-fold from six states in ￿scal year 1999 to thirty-four states in
￿scal year 2001. The ￿ve states with substantial programs prior to the settlement18 funded their
programs primarily through increases in excise taxes on cigarettes. The remaining states allocated
virtually no state funds toward such programs prior to the settlement (Figure 2). Among these
(non-prespending) states, mean per capita spending increased from only $0.04 in 1999 to $2.78
in the year after settlement funds were received. Despite displaying virtually no preference for
spending on tobacco control programs through the mid-to-late 1990s (a period of substantial budget
surpluses for most states), all but one of the non-prespending states had instituted such a program
by ￿scal year 2002.19 States with pre-existing programs also responded to settlement revenues,
increasing spending from an average of $4.15 per capita in ￿scal year 1999 to $7.67 in ￿scal year
2001.
18Arizona, California, Maine, Massachusetts and Oregon.
19The only state not allocating state funds toward tobacco prevention and control by ￿scal year 2002 was Tennessee.
15In the next sections, I test the predictions of the interest group model more formally.
4.2 Econometric Speci￿cation
The empirical strategy I employ to test for violations of fungibility is a variation on a traditional
￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation. By exploiting both the time series and cross-sectional variation in
settlement revenue receipt, I test for violations of fungibility in two ways. Consider the following
regression framework:
TobaccoControlit = ￿0 + ￿1(Settlementrevenue)it + ￿2 (Income)it + ￿t + ￿i + ￿Xit + "it (5)
where ￿t is a set of year dummies, ￿i is a set of state dummies and Xit is a set of time-varying state
controls. In a standard ￿xed e⁄ects setting, the key parameter of interest is ￿1, which would be
interpreted as measuring the e⁄ect of settlement revenue receipt on tobacco control spending. ￿t
would be included primarily as a control to pick up underlying trends in spending over time.
The tobacco control experiment is unusual in that the pre-trend in tobacco control spending
is essentially ￿ at and close to zero. A large, discontinuous increase in spending occurs when
settlement revenues are received (Figure 1). Thus, both ￿1 and the ￿t￿ s have causal meaning
and can be used to test for violations of fungibility. Coe¢ cients on the time dummies pick up
changes in tobacco control spending within a state over time; the ￿rst test is whether there exists
a discontinuity in spending at the time of settlement revenue receipt. The second test is whether
the marginal propensity to spend on tobacco control from settlement revenues is higher than the
marginal propensity to spend from state income. The relevant test is ￿1 > ￿2 (rather than ￿1 > 0)
to distinguish the income e⁄ect component of settlement revenue receipt from a true fungibility
e⁄ect. The ￿t coe¢ cients indicate whether states spent on the lobby good when they received
lobby funds and ￿1 indicates whether states that received more lobby money spent more on the
16lobby good.
There are two primary identi￿cation assumptions. The identifying assumption for ￿t is that
spending on tobacco control programs would not have changed from the ￿scal year before funds
were received to the ￿scal year after in the absence of receipt of settlement funds. The identifying
assumption for ￿1 is that the size of a state￿ s settlement windfall is orthogonal to other state
characteristics that might in￿ uence spending on tobacco control programs. The allocation formula
does re￿ ect the historical costs of smoking in each state, raising the potential concern that settlement
revenue is proxying for the need or desirability of spending money on such programs. I test both
identifying assumptions in Section 5.2.
4.3 Data
The last comprehensive surveys of state tobacco control spending prior to the settlement were
conducted by the Association for State and Territorial Health O¢ cials (ASTHO) in 1994. Data
on state spending for ￿scal years 1996￿ 2000 were collected by the author from individual states.
As illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2, only ￿ve states had substantial tobacco control programs
prior to the receipt of settlement funds; the remaining states spent virtually nothing.20 I exclude
￿scal year 2000 data from my analysis since states ￿rst received funds in the middle of this ￿scal
year.
Data on state tobacco control funding after settlement funds were received comes from two
sources. The primary data source is a series of State Highlights Reports published by the Centers
for Disease Control (CDC). Reported state allocations include funding speci￿cally appropriated to
any governmental agency, foundation, trust fund, board or university for tobacco control programs.
20Data for Alaska, Louisiana and Maryland were not obtainable for the 1996-2000 ￿scal years. These states spent
nothing in the 1990, 1992 and 1994 ASTHO surveys. I therefore assign them zero spending for 1996-1999. My
￿nding that almost all states spent virtually nothing on tobacco prevention and control programs prior to the receipt
of settlement funds is con￿rmed by numerous sources including CDC (1999) and Farrelly, et al. (2001).
17They do not include funds directed toward tobacco research, health services, tobacco farmers or
tobacco dependent communities (CDC 2001). In a few cases, appropriations were made for mul-
tiple ￿scal years at once or revenues were set aside in trust funds. The CDC includes the full
appropriation amount in the year in which it was allocated.
A secondary data source is information on allocation of tobacco settlement revenue compiled by
the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). Reported state allocations include funds for
community and school-based tobacco-use prevention programs, media campaigns, tobacco control
measures and tobacco cessation treatment (NCSL 2002). The major advantage of the NCSL data
is that they contain allocations for ￿scal years 2003 and 2004, whereas CDC data are currently
limited to ￿scal years 2001 and 2002. The main drawback is that NCSL data include only tobacco
control spending from settlement revenues. Data from the two sources are close in most cases, but
NCSL data underreport spending in states where settlement revenues were not the only funding
source for tobacco control programs. In addition, NCSL data do not include money set aside
in endowment funds. Both data sources re￿ ect appropriations for spending related to tobacco
control at the beginning of the ￿scal year and may di⁄er from actual expenditures. I use CDC
data whenever possible and supplement the analysis with NCSL data as a speci￿cation check and
also in cases in which adding additional years of data is especially useful. The two data sources
produce almost identical results.
Settlement revenues received by states were tabulated by the National Association of Attorneys
General (NAAG) and re￿ ect the amount disbursed to each state in a given ￿scal year.21 Sources
on the remaining variables are given in Appendix A.2.
21Arkansas and Missouri did not immediately achieve state-speci￿c ￿nality. Their settlement disbursements for




Table 5 provides summary statistics on per capita tobacco control program allocations for ￿scal
years 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002.22 The mean amount allocated toward tobacco control after
receipt of settlement funds is a little more than $3.00 per capita. There is substantial variation in
allocation amounts across states.
I test for violations of fungibility by estimating the following equation:
TobaccoControlit = ￿0 + ￿1(Srevit ￿ Srevt) + ￿2(Incit ￿ Inct) + ￿(After) + ￿i (6)
Srevit and Incit are per capita settlement revenue and income for state i in year t, After is an
indicator which is equal to 1 for ￿scal years 2001 and 2002 and ￿i is a state ￿xed e⁄ect. The two
tests are: ￿1 > ￿2 and ￿ > 0. Settlement revenue and income are measured in deviations from
the year mean so that ￿ can be interpreted as the change in spending at the average levels of these
variables. Per capita settlement revenue and income are measured in real 2002 dollars.
I ￿nd strong evidence that states violate fungibility in spending decisions as predicted by the
interest group model (Table 6). Column 1 gives the results when state ￿xed e⁄ects are not included.
￿1, the propensity to spend from settlement revenue, is 0.18 and signi￿cant at the 1% level; ￿2,
the propensity to spend out of income, is essentially zero and insigni￿cant. The average increase
in spending upon receipt of settlement funds, ￿; is 2.93 and also signi￿cant at the 1% level. This
represents an almost six-fold increase in spending. Adding state ￿xed e⁄ects does not a⁄ect the
coe¢ cient estimates, as shown in Column 2. ￿1 increases to 0.21 and ￿ to 3.07. In columns 3
and 4, I replace the indicator for After with a full set of time dummies. It is clear that the e⁄ect
22Data are not available for Arizona and Massachusetts for ￿scal year 2002.
19is being driven by a discontinuity at the time of settlement fund receipt; there is almost no change
in spending from ￿scal year 1998 to 1999 or from ￿scal year 2001 to 2002. Including earlier years
or using earlier years as the base years does not change the results.
Both e⁄ects are large in magnitude. The increase in spending from ￿scal year 1999 to 2001
at the mean income and mean per capita settlement revenue level (approximately $24) is $3.00.
Taking a propensity to spend of 20 cents per dollar of settlement revenue, this implies that per
capita spending at the minimum level of settlement revenue receipt ($11) would be $0.40 and
spending at the maximum level of receipt ($40) would be over $6.00.
While a marginal e⁄ect of 20 cents on the dollar may ￿rst appear small relative to existing
￿ ypaper estimates, it is quite large given the context of this particular experiment. Settlement
revenues received by states are generally much larger than the amount that could be feasibly spent
on tobacco prevention and control programs. Dollar-for-dollar spending might not be reasonable
in this case.
In addition, the marginal propensity to spend on tobacco control programs from state income
or state government revenue prior to the settlement was essentially zero. The existing ￿ ypaper
e⁄ect literature tends to report the propensity to spend out of grants for programs such as health
or education without considering the magnitude of the e⁄ect relative to the marginal propensity
to spend on those goods from income or state revenue. This raises di¢ culties when attempting to
compare the magnitude of ￿ ypaper across di⁄erent spending categories.
Another possible theory relevant in this particular context is that voters may have learned about
the costliness of smoking during the course of the lawsuits.23 However, states did not increase
spending on tobacco control programs during the lawsuits or even after the settlement agreement
was reached; spending increased only after the receipt of settlement funds. This discontinuity is
23This theory could generalize to other contexts if voters believe the timing or magnitude of categorical grants
carry real information about the desirability of spending in that category.
20di¢ cult to reconcile with a learning story. In addition, I show in the next section that factors
which we might expect to in￿ uence spending if states truly learned about the costliness of smoking,
such as smoking prevalence or youth smoking rates, have no e⁄ect on spending decisions.
5.2 Testing the Identifying Assumptions
The identi￿cation assumption for the After coe¢ cient is a constant underlying time trend. Figure
3 illustrates a plot of the time coe¢ cients obtained from regressing per capita tobacco control
spending on year dummies with state ￿xed e⁄ects for years 1992-2002. It seems clear that the
time trend prior to the settlement was ￿ at and that receipt of settlement funds is the key driving
factor behind the increase in spending from ￿scal year 1999 to ￿scal year 2001.
The identi￿cation assumption for the settlement revenue coe¢ cient is that settlement revenues
are not proxying for other state characteristics that might in￿ uence tobacco control spending. Such
factors cannot explain the discontinuity in spending over time, but must be addressed when using
cross-sectional variation in settlement payments across states, particularly since the settlement
revenue formula is a function of smoking-related factors.
I test this identi￿cation assumption by adding controls for measures of the need for tobacco
control programs using data from the post-settlement period with an indicator for whether the
state had a large pre-existing program (Table 7). I control for the percent of the state population
that smoked in 1998, state-speci￿c minimum spending guidelines recommended by the Centers for
Disease Control (for more details see Appendix A.2), and the state youth smoking rate in 1997.
These measures have no signi￿cant direct e⁄ects, no e⁄ect on the settlement revenue coe¢ cient,
and no additional explanatory power.24 The results are virtually unchanged when controls for
24The statistical signi￿cance of the settlement revenue coe¢ cient drops to the 10% level when the youth smoking
rate is added as a control as a result of reductions in sample size; comparable state-level data on youth smoking is
only available for half of the settlement states.
21region, youth share and conservativeness of the state are added (column 4).
The possibility remains that states do care about these factors, but in some nonlinear function
that is captured by the settlement revenue variable. I therefore examine the direct e⁄ect of
a variety of indicators of the costliness of smoking without including settlement revenue in the
regression (Appendix Table 1). Smoking prevalence, state-speci￿c minimum spending guidelines
recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and youth smoking rates have no signi￿cant e⁄ects
on tobacco control spending.
5.3 Robustness Checks
I perform two additional robustness checks: I substitute actual settlement revenues with simulated
￿gures re￿ ecting the recommended allocation formula and I use NCSL data on tobacco control
spending rather than CDC data. The results are given in Table 8. Both checks result in only
slight reductions in the marginal propensity to spend from settlement revenue: the coe¢ cient on
per capita settlement revenue is 0.18 when simulated settlement ￿gures are used and 0.19 when
NCSL data are used. Estimates are signi￿cant at the 1% level in both cases. The After coe¢ cient
drops to 2.05 when the NCSL data are used since these data underestimate spending in the post-
settlement period, particularly for states with pre-existing programs in which substantial funding
comes from non-settlement revenues. However, despite the downward bias, the coe¢ cient is still
large in magnitude and signi￿cant at the 1% level.
5.4 Persistence Over Time
I next test whether the e⁄ects are persistent or diminish over time by including NCSL data on
￿scal year 2003 and 2004 allocations. Again, NCSL data tabulates payments on tobacco control
programs only from settlement revenues and is therefore a biased measure of spending. The
22advantage is the availability of additional years of data, necessary for analyzing the dynamics of
the e⁄ect.
Table 9 presents regression results and Figure 4 and Figure 5 plot the time dummies and
settlement revenue coe¢ cients with 95% con￿dence intervals. Spending at the average levels of
per capita settlement revenue and income in ￿scal years 2001-2003 is almost identical. Spending
falls somewhat in ￿scal 2004, but the di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant. The propensity to
spend from settlement revenues is higher in ￿scal year 2002 relative to the other ￿scal years, but
there is no systematic decrease in spending propensity over time. In ￿scal 2004, spending at the
average levels of settlement revenue and income is $1.37 higher than in ￿scal 1999 in real terms,
and the propensity to spend is 0.16. Both e⁄ects are signi￿cant at the 1% level. Overall, the
e⁄ects appear to be strongly persistent, at least into the ￿fth year of fund receipt.
5.5 Further Predictions of the Interest Group Model
5.5.1 Interest Group E⁄ort
The model I have proposed argues that governments will spend on the lobby good in order to pay
back interest groups that exerted e⁄ort to procure funds. In the case of the tobacco settlement,
interest groups in some states were involved in lawsuits leading up to the settlement. Other states
simply signed on to the ￿nal settlement, receiving windfalls without e⁄ort by interest groups.25
Since these governments do not have interest groups to pay back, we should expect them to treat
settlement funds as they would other state income.
I test this prediction empirically by constructing an indicator equal to one if the state did not
￿le a lawsuit prior to the settlement. Interacting this indicator with settlement revenue and the
25Anti-tobacco and public health groups and activists provided expert testimony, produced "anti-smoking" reports,
supported the development of lawsuit strategies, and engaged in grassroots campaigns against the tobacco industry.
In the absence of direct measures of interest group e⁄ort, I use lawsuit ￿ling as a proxy. The following states did
not ￿le lawsuits: Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and Wyoming.
23After indicator, I ￿nd that states that did not ￿le lawsuits spent less than states that ￿led (Table
10). States that ￿led lawsuits increased average spending by $3.45 after receipt of settlement
funds compared with $1.41 for states that did not ￿le lawsuits, and the di⁄erence is statistically
signi￿cant at the 5% level. States that did not ￿le lawsuits also have a propensity to spend of 14
cents on the dollar compared to 23 cents for ￿ling states, although this di⁄erence is not statistically
signi￿cant.26
We might expect states that ￿led lawsuits to have di⁄erent underlying preferences for such
spending. However, we should then see di⁄erences in spending between lawsuit and non-lawsuit
states prior to the settlement as well as di⁄erences in the propensity to spend out of overall income.
I do not observe any such di⁄erences (unreported). In addition, any ￿xed di⁄erence across states
will be picked up by the state ￿xed e⁄ect. Interacting lawsuit ￿ling with settlement revenue and
the After indicator when state ￿xed e⁄ects are included captures whether or not these states react
di⁄erently than other states to the receipt of settlement funds relative to other income.
Similar patterns are observed in Lutz￿ s (2004) study of a New Hampshire court-mandated
school ￿nance reform. Although he ￿nds little evidence of ￿ ypaper e⁄ects overall, he does ￿nd
that "plainti⁄ towns" that ￿led the suits leading to the court mandate spend signi￿cantly more
than other municipalities on education upon receipt of the resulting state grants.27
5.5.2 Discount Factor
The model predicts that governments that weigh future periods more should spend more on tobacco
prevention and control programs. I do not ￿nd interaction e⁄ects of years to the next election
or governor￿ s eligibility for re-election on spending (unreported). It is likely that these measures
26No-lawsuit states still spend $2.45 less on average when major tobacco producing states (Georgia, Kentucky,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia) are excluded, although this result is no longer statistically
signi￿cant (column 2).
27I thank Byron Lutz for helpful discussion on this point.
24are imperfect proxies for the true discount factor. I argue in the next section that eligibility for
re-election, in particular, appears to be picking up political constraints on government rather than
the government discount factor.
5.5.3 Political Factors
The model in Section 2 does not consider political agency on the part of the government and
is equivalent to a model in which decisions are made by a median voter. I now consider the
implications of the model in a world with political partisanship. In particular, I relate the interest
group model to models of the political process in which politicians have preferred policies and cannot
credibly commit to enact more moderate policies if elected (Alesina 1988, Alesina and Rosenthal
1995). In these models, policy convergence is achieved through repeated elections (politicians are
punished if they break their promises once in o¢ ce) or through compromises between the executive
and legislature if the government is divided.
We can think of politicians in this world making their decisions based on a utility function
that is some weighted average of the utility function of the politician and the utility function
of the median voter. We might imagine that di⁄erent politicians have di⁄erent utility costs of
misallocating toward tobacco control programs, particularly from a corner solution in which no
funds were being spent. The necessary condition for Reciprocating is then more likely to be
satis￿ed when the costs of misallocation are low. If politicians from one political party face lower
costs of misallocating on such programs than the median voter and politicians from the other party
face higher costs, we should observe the party with low costs spending more. Suppose for now
that Democrats face lower costs of misallocating toward tobacco control than the median voter and
that Republicans face higher costs. The model then predicts that we should observe Democrats
spending more from settlement funds than Republicans. It further generates the strong prediction
25that factors that lead to greater political convergence, such as eligibility for re-election and facing
an opposition controlled legislature, should then decrease spending for Democrats and increase
spending for Republicans. (The pattern would be reversed if in fact Republicans are the low cost
party.)
I test these predictions by analyzing the e⁄ects of political factors on spending in the post-
settlement period.28 I ￿nd strong evidence in support of the model (Table 11). Having a
Republican governor at the time the budget for the ￿scal year is passed decreases average spending
by $1.90 from a base of $4.74 (signi￿cant at 10%). Having a Republican governor also decreases
the propensity to spend to 5 cents on the dollar from a base of 37 cents on the dollar, and this
di⁄erence is signi￿cant at the 1% level. Note that we do not see di⁄ering propensities to spend
out of other income, indicating that these results are not being driven solely by di⁄erences in the
propensity to spend on tobacco control.
I ￿nd that eligibility for re-election (which should move parties closer to the median voter)
reduces both average spending and the propensity to spend for Democrats and increases both for
Republicans (column 2). Similarly, facing an opposition controlled state senate decreases spending
for Democrats and increases spending for Republicans, both on average and at the margin (column
3).
These results should be taken with some caution given the relatively small sample size. Nev-
ertheless, the patterns are quite striking and consistent, lending support to the interest group
model.
28I focus on the post-settlement period because the vast majority of states were not spending anything on such
programs prior to the settlement. The direct e⁄ect of political factors in the pre-settlement period cannot be credibly
estimated.
266 Conclusion
I ￿nd clear evidence that states systematically violate fungibility in spending decisions in response to
windfalls received under the tobacco settlement. The observed spending patterns are not consistent
with existing models of the political process. The interaction e⁄ects of lawsuit participation and
political factors are also di¢ cult to reconcile with a mental accounting story. I ￿nd support for my
proposed model, which predicts violations of fungibility as a result of dynamic interactions between
interest groups and local government. Spending patterns also conform to the speci￿c predictions
of the model when we allow political partisanship and policy divergence.
As noted in the introduction, there are at least two main caveats to generalizing these results.
First, settlement revenues were not speci￿cally labeled for tobacco prevention and control programs,
whereas most grants-in-aid are labeled for particular projects. In this model, the relevant factor is
not the label of the grant but rather the preference of the interest group that procured the grant.
In practice, these are likely to be the same for most grants-in-aid. The model can thus provide
an explanation for cases of classic ￿ ypaper e⁄ects. Second, the transfers in the settlement are
from industry to local government. The same model, however, applies to grants from federal to
local governments; if anything, we might expect the links between interest groups and grants to be
stronger in the case of intergovernmental grants.
The interest group model would not be as applicable to situations in which there is truly no
discretionary component to grants-in-aid. This is rarely the case. As mentioned, a substantial
share of intergovernmental grants are allocated on a discretionary basis. In addition, ￿ ypaper e⁄ects
in entitlement programs are generally identi￿ed from program expansions. These expansions may
be the result of interest group involvement, in which case the incentives outlined in the model
would apply. Observed ￿ ypaper e⁄ects in other contexts, such as in spending by local governments
in response to grants from international aid agencies and non-governmental organizations, could
27also be explained by a similar type of dynamic interaction between local governments and granting
agencies.
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31Appendix
A.1 Solution to Interest Group Model
Since the Committed government always pays back, the probability of being Committed condi-
tional on Reciprocate must be at least p0. If p0 > p, interest groups always provide e⁄ort in period
1 and e⁄ort in period 2 if the government Reciprocates in period 1. If p0 < p, the equilibrium
condition requires that the interest group in period 2 will randomize so that the government is
indi⁄erent in period 1; in other words, so that the the posterior probability of Committed condi-
tional on Reciprocate is exactly the threshold value p. If ￿ is the probability of Reciprocate by
a Strategic government, Bayes￿rule implies that the probability of being Committed conditional
on Reciprocate is
p0
p0+￿(1￿p0). Setting this equal to p and solving gives ￿ =
p0a
(1￿p0)b. The total
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. We can now solve by induction to the N period case. For example, when N = 3 we
can see that if p0 > p2, the government will Reciprocate and the interest group will provide funds.
If p0 is between p2 and p3, the government will randomize and the interest group will provide funds
in period 1. If p0 < p3, the government will randomize and the interest group will not provide
funds in period 1. The prior probability of a Committed government (p0) required for the interest







Centers for Disease Control Minimum Spending Guidelines: The Centers for Disease Con-
trol put forth a 1999 report with "best practices" state-speci￿c spending guidelines. The re-
port included the CDC￿ s estimate of the minimum spending required for each state to imple-
ment comprehensive and e⁄ective tobacco control programs. The full report is available at:
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/bestprac.htm.
Lawsuit Participation: This variable indicates whether a state ￿led a lawsuit prior to the
settlement. The indicator is taken from a summary of litigation documents available at the
following website: http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/summary.html
Political Variables: Data on political parties come from various issues of The Book of the States,
published by the Council of State Governments. Gubernatorial and state senate control re￿ ect
the party in power at the time budget allocations are made for the ￿scal year. The independent
governor of Maine was classi￿ed as a Democrat. Eligibility for re-election was computed taking
into account state-speci￿c term limit laws.
State Population and Income: Bureau of Economic Analysis. The calendar year population
and income are counted for the next ￿scal year (ex: 1990 population counted for the 1991 ￿scal
year).
Youth Share: 2000 census. The youth share is the percentage of the state population under
18.
Smoking Variables: Percent of population that smokes from Centers for Disease Control; youth
smoking rate from the Youth Tobacco Surveys (YTS).
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FIGURE 1 




























funding > $0.50 per cap
 
Notes:  This figure illustrates spending for the 46 states that were involved in the settlement.  Data for 1990, 1992 
and 1994 come from surveys conducted by the American State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO).  Data for 
1996-2000 were collected by author.  Data for 2001-2002 come from the CDC.   
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FIGURE 2 
Mean Per Capita Spending on Tobacco Control Programs 


















Notes:  All figures given in 2002 dollars.  Excludes Arizona, California, Maine, Massachusetts and Oregon.  Data 
for 1990, 1992 and 1994 come from surveys conducted by the American State and Territorial Health Officials 
(ASTHO).  Data for 1996-2000 were collected by author.  Data for 2001-2002 come from the CDC.     35  
FIGURE 3 
Test of After Coefficient Identification Assumption  
































Notes:  All figures given in 2002 dollars.  Data for 1990, 1992 and 1994 come from surveys conducted by the 
American State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO).  Data for 1996-2000 were collected by author.  Data for 
2001-2002 come from the CDC.     36  
FIGURE 4 
Persistence of Spending Over Time 
































Propensity to Spend Over Time 
































Notes:  All figures given in 2002 dollars.  Data for 1998-1999 were collected by author.  Data for 2001-
2004 come from the NCSL.    37  
TABLE 1 
Settlement Payments Through 2025 
 












2000         $6,411,750,000 
     Initial  $2,472,000,000   
     Annual  $3,939,750,000   
2001   $6,923,660,000 
     Initial  $2,546,160,000   
     Annual  $4,377,500,000   
2002   $8,313,294,800 
     Initial  $2,622,544,800   
     Annual  $5,690,750,000   
2003   $8,391,971,144 
     Initial  $2,701,221,144   
     Annual  $5,690,750,000   
2004-2007   $28,016,000,000 
     Annual  $7,004,000,000   
2008-2017   $80,040,000,000 
     Annual  $7,143,000,000   
     SCF  $861,000,000   
2018-2025   $64,031,999,976 
     Annual  $8,003,999,997   
TOTAL   $204,528,675,920 
Notes:  Figures reported are without any adjustments other than the Previously Settled States reduction.  Source: 
National Governors’ Association. www.nga.org/cda/files/TOBDETAIL.pdf. 
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TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics:  Settlement Revenues (FY 2002) 




     
Min  13,800 10.25 56.74 
Median  68,300 21.55 89.90 
Mean  101,000 21.97 98.26 
Max 361,000  37.20  172.13 
N  46 46 46 
Notes:  These figures include both annual and initial payments.    39  



























New Hampshire  0.67% 0.59%
New Jersey  3.87% 3.97%
New Mexico  0.60% 0.50%
New York  12.76% 13.91%
North Carolina  2.33% 2.50%





Rhode Island  0.72% 0.66%
South Carolina  1.18% 1.18%






West Virginia  0.89% 1.01%
Wisconsin 2.07% 2.16%
Wyoming 0.25% 0.14%
Notes:  Simulated figures calculated from formula after removing shares of non-settlement states.  Correlation: 0.99.   40  
 TABLE 4 





Settlement Revenue per Capita 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Smoking attributable Medicaid  0.534** 0.154       
  (0.036) (0.079)       
Smoking attributable other health  0.103** 0.081**       
  (0.005) (0.010)       
Smoking attr. Medicaid per cap     0.625**  0.404** 0.387** 0.391** 
     (0.105)  (0.133) (0.133) (0.142) 
Smoking attr. other health per cap     0.067**  0.085** 0.103** 0.119** 
     (0.022)  (0.027) (0.033) (0.040) 
State income per cap      -2.01e-04  -1.38e-04 
      (1.92e-04)  (2.26e-04) 
Pre-settlement program        -1.437 
        (2.411) 
Youth share (2000)        -0.016 
        (0.572) 
Repub vote share (2000)        0.094 
        (0.120) 
        
Observations  46 46 46 46 46 46 
R-squared  0.992 0.901 0.716 0.530 0.542 0.557 
Notes:  Smoking attributable Medicaid and smoking attributable other health correspond to SMCDi and AdjDMCi in 
the allocation formula.  Columns 1 and 3 do not adjust New York and California state settlement revenues for 
payments made directly to counties.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   41  
TABLE 5 
Summary Statistics:  Tobacco Prevention and Control Program Spending 
  FY 1998  FY 1999  FY 2001  FY 2002 
        
Min 0  0  0  0 
Median 0  0  2.30  2.78 
Mean 0.52  0.49  3.34  3.21 
Max 6.88  6.51  21.26  18.10 
N 46  46  44  44 
Notes: All figures in 2002 dollars.  Data for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 compiled by author.  Data for fiscal years 
2001 and 2002 come from CDC.     42  
TABLE 6 
Per Capita Spending on Tobacco Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Settlement rev per capita  0.184** 0.210** 0.187** 0.214** 
  (0.042) (0.045) (0.043) (0.046) 
State income per capita  2.87e-05  -4.80e-04  2.73e-05  -4.93e-04 
  (5.02e-05) (3.42e-04) (5.05e-04) (3.45e-04) 
After  2.927** 3.071**    
  (0.409) (0.318)    
FY=1999     -0.031  -0.031 
     (0.572)  (0.442) 
FY=2001     3.107**  3.174** 
     (0.583)  (0.456) 
FY=2002     2.720**  2.943** 
     (0.579)  (0.449) 
Constant  0.507  0.523  
 (0.285)    (0.405)   
      
State Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes 
      
Observations  180 180 180 180 
R-squared  0.274 0.447 0.276 0.448 
Notes:  Settlement revenue per capita and income per capita are de-meaned.  Years: 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002.  
Fiscal year 2000 excluded because settlement revenues were received in the middle of this fiscal year.  * significant 
at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   43  
TABLE 7 
Test of Settlement Revenue Identification Assumption 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Settlement rev per cap  0.199** 0.199*  0.255
+ 0.206** 
  (0.070) (0.090) (0.148) (0.071) 
State inc per cap  -5.30e-06  3.56e-07  -1.37e-04  -1.12e-04 
  (9.48e-05) (1.04e-04) (1.55e-04) (1.31e-04) 
Pre-settlement  program  4.069** 4.184** 6.072**  3.067 
  (1.411) (1.402) (2.083) (1.966) 
FY  =  2002  -0.218 -0.222 -0.605 -0.269 
  (0.467) (0.522) (0.871) (0.490) 
% pop smokes (1998)  -0.053      -0.090 
  (0.176)    (0.172) 
CDC recommended min per cap    -0.013     
   (0.257)     
Youth smoking rate (1997)      -0.160   
     (0.170)   
Region = South        0.831 
       (1.510) 
Region = Midwest        2.931 
       (2.146) 
Region = West        2.510 
       (2.063) 
Youth share (2000)        -0.133 
       (0.293) 
Repub vote share (2000 pres)        -0.142
+ 
       (0.077) 
Constant 4.417  3.278  9.234  14.388 
  (4.138) (2.548) (6.620)  (10.622) 
      
Observations  88 88 43 88 
R-squared  0.221 0.219 0.270 0.321 
Notes:  Settlement revenue per capita and income per capita are de-meaned.  Years: 2001, 2002.  All columns are 
pooled OLS with state-clustered standard errors.  













      
Settlement rev per capita  0.210** 0.177** 0.185** 
  (0.045) (0.041) (0.039) 
State income per capita  -4.80e-04  -1.65e-04  -2.24e-04 
 (3.42e-04)  (4.78e-04)  (2.89e-04) 
After  3.071** 2.911** 2.051** 
  (0.318) (0.321) (0.273) 
      
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Observations 180  180  182 
R-squared 0.447  0.663  0.351 
Notes:  Settlement revenue per capita and income per capita are de-meaned.  Years: 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002.  
Fiscal year 2000 excluded because settlement revenues were received in the middle of this fiscal year.  * significant 
at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 9 
Persistence of the Effects over Time 
 
(1) 
FY 1998, 1999, 2001-2004 
(2) 
FY 1998, 1999, 2001-2004 
    
Settlement rev per cap  0.159**  0.184** 
 (0.034)  (0.042) 
Settlement rev per cap*(FY>2002)    -0.039 
   (0.039) 
FY = 1999  0.056  0.056 
 (0.402)  (0.402) 
FY = 2001  2.085**  2.123** 
 (0.411)  (0.413) 
FY = 2002  2.127**  2.127** 
 (0.402)  (0.402) 
FY = 2003  2.142**  2.142** 
 (0.402)  (0.402) 
FY = 2004  1.368**  1.368** 
 (0.402)  (0.402) 
State inc per cap  7.64e-06  6.78e-05 
 (3.38e-04)  (3.43e-04) 
    
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
    
Observations 274  274 
R-squared 0.585  0.587 
Notes:  Settlement revenue per capita and income per capita are de-meaned.  Years: 1998, 1999, 2001-2004.  Fiscal 
year 2000 excluded because settlement revenues were received in the middle of this fiscal year.  * significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1%.  Tobacco control spending data from 2001-2004 from the NCSL.   46  
TABLE 10 
Tests of the Interest Group Model 
 (1)  (2) 
Settlement revenue per capita  0.227**  0.227** 
 (0.048)  (0.052) 
(No lawsuit)*(Settlement rev per cap)  -0.083  0.083 
  (0.135)  (0.273) 
After 3.449**  3.478** 
 (0.347)  (0.378) 
(No Lawsuit)*After  -2.032*  -2.450 
  (0.965)  (1.753) 
State income per capita  -4.83e-04  -6.23e-04 
 (3.38e-04)  (3.71e-04) 
    
State fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
    
Observations 180  156 
R-squared 0.473  0.482 
Notes:  No lawsuit states are Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and Wyoming.  
Settlement revenue per capita and income per capita are de-meaned.  Years: 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002.  Fiscal year 
2000 excluded because settlement revenues were received in the middle of this fiscal year.  Column 1 includes all 
states.  Column 2 excludes big tobacco producing states: Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee and Virginia.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   47  
TABLE 11 
Testing the Predictions of the Model with Political Partisanship 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
       
Settlement revenue per capita  0.369**  0.595** 0.469** 
 (0.091)  (0.168) (0.098) 
(Repub governor)*(Settle rev per cap)  -0.318**  -0.579** -0.375* 
  (0.103)  (0.178) (0.181) 
(Elig for re-election)*(Settle rev pc)    -0.332
+   
   (0.198)   
(Repub gov)*(Elig)*(Settle rev pc)    0.438
+   
   (0.232)   
(Opposition senate)*(Settle rev pc)      -0.443** 
     (0.116) 
(Repub gov)*(Opp senate)*(Settle rev pc)      0.378* 
     (0.181) 
Constant  (measures avg spending for Democrats)  4.742**  4.581** 5.463** 
 (0.781)  (1.125) (0.864) 
Repub governor  -1.900
+  -2.594* -2.223 
  (0.957)  (1.228) (1.406) 
Eligible for re-election    -0.178  
   (1.386)  
(Repub governor)*(Elig)    1.905  
   (1.884)  
Opposition senate      -2.612** 
     (0.905) 
(Repub governor)*(Opposition senate)      1.634 
     (1.623) 
State income per capia  -2.01e-05  5.81e-06 6.88e-05 
 (2.32e-04)  (9.78e-04) (8.00e-05) 
(Repub governor)*(State income per capita)  8.29e-05    
 (2.46e-04)    
     
Observations 88  88 88 
R-squared 0.157  0.303 0.334 
Notes:  Years: 2001, 2002.  Controls for an indicator for fiscal year 2002.  Settlement revenue per capita, income per 
capita are de-meaned. 
 All columns are pooled OLS with state-clustered standard errors.  + significant at 10%; * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.     48  
 
APPENDIX TABLE 1 
Effect of Smoking Related Variables on Per Capita Tobacco Control Spending 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
% pop smokes (1998)  0.016     
 (0.185)     
CDC recommended min per cap    0.311   
   (0.216)   
Youth smoking rate (1997)      -0.037 
     (0.163) 
State inc per cap  6.64e-05  9.77e-05  -9.56e-06 
 (8.31e-05)  (8.14e-05)  (1.42e-04) 
Pre-settlement program  3.971  4.248*  8.113** 
 (2.136)  (1.950)  (1.335) 
FY = 2002  0.114  0.130  -0.299 
 (0.442)  (0.442)  (0.852) 
Constant 2.452  0.419  4.913 
 (4.323)  (1.875)  (6.297) 
      
Observations 88  88  43 
R-squared 0.097  0.139  0.175 
Notes:  Years: 2001, 2002.  Income per capita is de-meaned.  All columns are pooled OLS with state-clustered 
standard errors.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 